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Abstract 
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emerging economies experiencing a shorter-lived retrenchment than 
developed economies. Our econometric analysis shows that the magnitude of 
the retrenchment in capital flows across countries is linked to the extent of 
international financial integration, its specific nature—with countries relying 
on bank flows being the hardest hit—as well as domestic macroeconomic 
conditions and their connection to world trade flows. 
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The current crisis saw an unprecedented collapse in international 
capital flows after years of rising financial globalization. We 
identify the stylized facts and main drivers of this development. 
The retrenchment in international capital flows is a highly 
heterogeneous phenomenon: first across time, being especially 
dramatic in the wake of the Lehman Brothers’ failure, second 
across types of flows, with banking flows being the hardest hit 
due to their sensitivity of risk perception, and third across 
regions, with emerging economies experiencing a shorter-lived 
retrenchment than developed economies. Our econometric 
analysis shows that the magnitude of the retrenchment in capital 
flows across countries is linked to the extent of international 
financial integration, its specific nature—with countries relying 
on bank flows being the hardest hit—as well as domestic 
macroeconomic conditions and their connection to world trade 
flows.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The global crisis that started in mid-2007 brought an abrupt stop to the sustained 
rise in international financial integration over the previous decade (figure 1). Global 
capital flows had steadily increased from less than 7 percent of world GDP in 1998 to 
over 20 percent in 2007, led in particular by a dramatic expansion of flows to and from 
advanced economies. These flows simply evaporated during the crisis, which saw large 
repatriation of capital in many countries. What lies behind this “great retrenchment” in 
capital flows? Did flows fall evenly across countries and categories of flows? Can we 
link the intensity of the great retrenchment to financial and macroeconomic 
characteristics of countries? Is the trend towards rising financial globalization over? The 
purpose of this paper is to document the collapse in capital flows across a range of 
developed and emerging economies and to provide answers—some of them necessarily 
speculative—to these questions. 
 
We assess the patterns of the retrenchment in international capital flows, and the 
underlying driving forces. We document that the retrenchment led to an increase in 
portfolio “home bias”, i.e. a reduction of the share of foreign assets in investors’ 
portfolio. Our analysis stresses two broad themes. First, there is a high degree of 
heterogeneity in the patterns of capital flows, across time, types of flows and countries. 
Second, international banking flows—particularly among advanced economies—played a 
central role both during the pre-crisis globalization and in the crisis itself, a finding in line 
with earlier work (Bank for International Settlements 2009, Bertaut and Pounder 2009). 
 
Our analysis relies on an extensive dataset of capital flows for 75 countries at a 
quarterly frequency, with data until the last quarter of 2009. These data are integrated 
with figures on banks operations through affiliates, and data on domestic financial 
balance sheets for several countries. To our knowledge this work is the only contribution 
relying on such an extensive and detailed dataset of balance of payments statistics. 
Existing studies on international capital flows during the crisis are focused on specific 
countries, such as the United States (Bertaut and Pounder, 2009) or specific dimensions 
(such as banking flows—Bank for International Settlements, 2009).  
 
We start by documenting the patterns of capital flows before and during the crisis, 
and stress how heterogeneous the crisis has been. The first stage of the crisis (from 
August 2007 to the demise of Lehman Brothers and the AIG bailout) saw a slowdown in 
capital flows that was concentrated in banking flows among developed economies. In 
contrast, capital flows to and from emerging markets were generally not affected. The 
second stage of the crisis coincides with the global panic after the fall of Lehman 
Brothers (last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009), and was characterized by a broad 
reversal of capital flows, with investors across the globe liquidating holdings abroad. 
While the reversal occurred for most types of flows, it was most pronounced in banking 
flows. The retrenchment was also not confined geographically and emerging markets 
were hit by a sharp reversal in flows. The third stage of the crisis, starting in the second 
quarter of 2009, saw a recovery of non-bank capital flows, particularly in Asian and Latin  
  3
American emerging markets. In contrast, flows among developed economies remained 
well below pre-crisis level, with bank flows still contracting. 
 
Our next step assesses the underlying drivers of capital flows. We argue that the 
central feature of the collapse in flows during the current crisis has been a shock to risk 
aversion, as investors’ confidence fell abruptly amidst concerns about the quality of 
financial assets and the solvency of prominent banks. The impact of this shock on a 
specific country depends on the extent and nature of its international financial linkages, 
its macroeconomic conditions, and its dependence on world trade. A re-assessment of 
risk by investors is likely to lead to a more significant pull-back from countries with large 
net external liabilities, particularly in the form of debt, or those whose external portfolio 
was more exposed to liquidity risk (for example, countries with large banking positions). 
Countries that experienced a credit-fueled boom, or where domestic growth and fiscal 
prospects worsened, were also likely to be more heavily hit. And finally, with the 
collapse in global trade countries more dependent on exports, particularly of “cyclical” 
goods such as investment goods and durables, were likely to be most affected. 
 
Our formal assessment of the drivers of the capital flow retrenchment proceeds in 
two steps. We first contrast countries with the largest retrenchments from countries with 
the smallest ones. This allows us to consider a broad range of variables, but not to isolate 
their specific roles. Our second step is thus a cross-section econometric assessment of the 
drivers of capital flows. We find that the changes in capital flows during the crisis are 
related to the structure of the countries’ external portfolios prior to the crisis. In 
particular, countries with large pre-crisis external assets and liabilities in the form of debt 
instruments—where banks play an important role—were hit with a deeper retrenchment 
of flows during the most acute phase of the crisis. These countries, primarily advanced 
economies in Europe as well as the United States, still faced flows substantially below 
their pre-crisis levels during its third stage. The evidence also points to sharper and more 
persistent declines in capital inflows in countries that entered the crisis with higher net 
external liabilities, particularly in the form of debt—such as several countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
 
Looking forward, we conjecture that while the trend to financial globalization will 
persist, its nature is likely to change. This is because international bank flows are unlikely 
to regain their pre-crisis magnitude for a variety of reasons, including the fallout from the 
crisis, ongoing regulatory efforts to rein in large banks, and the fact that the pace of pre-
crisis flows among advanced economies implied a dramatic expansion in cross-border 
financial balance sheets relative to the size of individual economies. In contrast, financial 
globalization in emerging markets, which had proceeded at a less dramatic clip, could 
well prove more robust. In most emerging markets financial systems were less affected 
by the crisis: no dramatic expansion in banks’ cross-border activity had taken place, and 
there is still ample scope for increased portfolio diversification across borders.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section II we briefly 
review the pattern of financial globalization in the years before the crisis, focusing on the 
role of banking flows. We turn to developments during the crisis in section III, drawing  
  4
the main stylized patterns for industrialized economies and emerging markets. Section IV 
reviews the literature on the financial crisis and discusses our theoretical a priori about 
the driving forces. Section V presents an empirical assessment of the drivers of capital. 
We conclude and discuss the prospects for the future of globalization in section VI. 
 
II.   FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION BEFORE THE CRISIS 
The decade prior to the crisis saw a boom in international capital flows. Figure 1 
shows that the pace at which investors purchased foreign assets picked up substantially in 
the early 1990’s. While the dispersion in world current account balances and net external 
positions expanded significantly—with some countries running large deficits as other ran 
large surpluses—the increase in two-way international capital flows and total external 
assets and liabilities was even more dramatic (see for instance Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
2007, Gerlach et al. 2009). In this section we briefly review the salient features of this 
process of financial globalization, drawing on several complementary measures. Box 1 
provides a brief description of international capital flows and their components, and 
Appendix A lists the data sources. Our analysis highlights the following key points: 
 
•  The increase of cross-border asset holdings reflects a higher share of foreign assets in 
portfolios, in addition to a generalized rise in the value of assets relative to GDP 
(financial deepening). 
 
•  The increase in international capital flows and cross-border holdings was more 
pronounced in advanced economies than in emerging markets. 
 
•  Growing international financial linkages was accompanied by an increase in the 
dispersion of current account balances and size of creditor and debtor positions. 
 
•  Financial globalization was particularly rapid in the banking sector of advanced 
economies, including for regulatory arbitrage purposes.  
 
•  International banking integration took the form of both cross-border lending and 
operations through foreign affiliates. 
 
While Figure 1 shows increased international capital flows, it does not allow us to 
distinguish between the underlying drivers. We are specifically interested in 
distinguishing between financial deepening (an increase in financial assets with 
unchanged allocation between domestic and foreign assets) and a reduction in home bias 
(an increase in the share of financial assets invested in foreign assets).  
 
In the last fifteen years the world has experienced substantial financial deepening. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2 which presents the value of total financial assets and GDP 
for several countries in 1997, 2002 and 2007. There is a clear positive trend in all 
countries, with a noticeable pickup in the pace of deepening since 2002 in several 
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. This process reflects a 
variety of underlying factors: for example, sharp increases in asset prices, driving up the  
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valuation of financial wealth; higher borrowing, backed by higher valuations of 
nonfinancial assets such as property; and a boom in securitization, which raises the total 
value of financial instruments outstanding. 
 
If countries allocate overseas a stable fraction of financial assets, the process of 
financial deepening will naturally lead to a pickup of cross-border capital flows, even if 
investors do not increase the share of their financial wealth that they want to invest 
abroad (the “portfolio growth” driver of international capital flows pointed by Kraay and 
al., 2005). However, financial deepening can offer only a partial account of the rise in 
international financial flows; the main driver has instead been an increase in the fraction 
of wealth invested abroad (the “portfolio reallocation” channel of capital flows). This is 
illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the change in the share of foreign assets in residents’ 
portfolios in recent years. Most countries saw this portfolio share increase by between 1 
and 2 percentage points annually during the boom of the 2000’s (top panel). A finer look 
at the data shows that this reflected a deliberate investment choice. The share of foreign 
assets could indeed increase without any action by investors if asset prices increase faster 
abroad than in the investor country. This impact of asset price changes on the portfolio 
shares, depicted by the green bars, was generally moderate, reflecting the fact that asset 
prices increases fairly evenly across the world. The change in the portfolio share was 
instead the result of active portfolio management: investors stepped up their purchases of 
foreign assets relative to their acquisition of domestic assets, with the impact of these 
purchases on the portfolio share shown by the blue bars. 
 
The increasing appetite of investors for foreign assets also reflects the reduction 
of formal restrictions on international capital mobility. Figure 4 presents two measures of 
international capital mobility, namely the index of restrictions on capital mobility from 
Schindler, 2009 (top panel), and the index of capital mobility from Chinn and Ito, 2008 
(bottom panel). Both measures show a decline in de jure restrictions on international 
capital mobility, with some evidence of a pickup of the shift in the first half of the 
1990’s, as shown by the unweighted Chinn-Ito index. Other factors imperfectly captured 
by these indices include financial harmonization legislation within the European Union 
and the advent of the euro, which spurred international capital mobility within Europe.  
 
Financial globalization led to a polarization of net external positions and flows, 
with some countries posting large current accounts deficits, while other experienced large 
surpluses (see for example Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2010). For instance some 
economies in the euro area and Central and Eastern Europe experienced a rapid rise of 
their current account deficits and net external liabilities against a background of easy 
access to external finance (as shown by a very sharp compression in spreads). Another 
well-documented aspect of globalization is its concentration in developed economies, 
where the value of both external assets and liabilities rose at a much faster pace than in 
emerging markets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007, Gerlach et al., 2009). This trend 
towards was also accompanied by an increase in flows for regulatory arbitrage purposes,  
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International banking activity played a major role in financial globalization. The 
Bank of International Settlements compiles detailed data on international bank activity. 
Its “locational” data cover the assets and liabilities of banks in different countries using 
the residency concept of the balance of payments (Appendix A presents the data in more 
details). The value of cross-border bank lending increased substantially since the early 
1990’s, and particularly on the eve of the crisis (figure 5). The value external assets of 
banks in the BIS sample rose from 27 percent of world GDP in 1990 to 59 percent in 
2007, with 80 percent of this pickup taking place since 2000. International banking 
activity is also heavily concentrated in developed economies where 80 percent of cross-
border banking assets are located.
3 
 
The rising role of international banking in terms of stocks is also observed in 
terms of capital flows. Figure 6 presents the split of flows between bank and other flows 
(red and blue bars respectively). We contrast the situation between outflows and inflows 
(left and right panels), between advanced economies and emerging markets (top and 
bottom panels), and through time. Specifically, we distinguish between an early stage of 
the pre-crisis boom (from 2000 to 2004), a late stage of the boom (until the middle of 
2007), the initial stage of the crisis (2007.3 to the eve of the Lehman Brothers collapse), a 
second “collapse” stage (2008.4-2009.1) and a “recovery” stage through the rest of 2009. 
We defer a fuller discussion of the three crisis stages to the next section. 
 
International bank lending took a greater prominence in the last stage of the 
boom. This is especially the case for advanced economies, where the share of bank 
lending in overall flows was high and rose substantially from a quarter to a third. 
Emerging markets by contrast show less reliance on bank lending, which represented 
only 16 percent of gross inflows on the eve of the crisis, and a mere 9 percent of 
outflows. This pattern reflects the boom in interbank lending activity between advanced 
financial markets, especially between the United States and Europe as European banks 
took a substantial presence in the U.S. market, and vice-versa (BIS 2009, 2010), as well 
as within Europe where cross-border lending took off with the integration of markets in 
the European Union. Investment in emerging markets by contrast was more reliant on 
other types of funds, such as FDI and portfolio investment. 
 
The degree of international bank integration is even deeper that what cross-border 
bank lending indicates. A bank can lend to a foreign borrower either by lending directly 
                                                 
2 Examples include the activities of euro area banks conducted through their affiliates in the United 
Kingdom; the mutual fund industry in Luxembourg as well as Ireland; hedge funds, international banking 
activity, and structured finance conducted through the Cayman Islands; and the importance of Ireland for 
the treasury management operations of large multinational companies. 
3 The situation is similar for liabilities.  
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across the border, or by doing so through an affiliate in the borrower’s country. The first 
strategy entails a claim by a domestic resident (the bank) on a foreign one (the borrower) 
and thus enters the balance of payments. The second strategy by contrast entails a loan 
from the foreign subsidiary to the foreign borrower, and thus does not involve the parent 
bank. It is thus not recorded in the balance of payments. 
 
The role of affiliates is captured by the Bank for International Settlements’ 
“consolidated” statistics, which combine lending activities cross-border and through 
affiliates. The latter is in turn split between lending in “local” currency and in other 
currencies. The data are available on an “immediate borrower” basis and an “ultimate 
risk” basis (where the latter corrects for the fact that the immediate borrower may benefit 
from a guarantee from or risk transfer to a third party). While data on an immediate 
borrower basis covers a longer horizon, it does not isolate cross-border lending. Data on 
an ultimate risk basis distinguishes between cross-border lending and lending through 
affiliates, but is only available since 2005 and covers a narrower set of reporting banks 
(more details are provided in Appendix A). 
 
Lending through affiliates represents a substantial share of international banking 
activity. Between 1999 and 2007 overall foreign claims of the reporting banks rose from 
32 to 62 percent of world GDP (immediate borrower basis, top-left panel of figure 7).
4 
Operations through foreign affiliates represent a large and growing share of this 
exposure, reaching 44 percent of all claims to developed economies and 52 percent of 
claims to developing countries on the eve of the crisis (ultimate risk basis, right panels). 
Table 1 details the growth pattern from December 2005 to December 2007 and shows 
that both cross-border lending and lending through affiliates grew in line on the eve of 
the crisis. 
 
III.   INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS DURING THE CRISIS 
The long period of buoyant capital flows described in the previous section has 
come to an abrupt halt as the global financial crisis intensified. This section offers a 
concise review of the major stylized facts in the crisis, with the following six main points 
emerging: 
 
•  The collapse in capital flows reflects an active reduction of the portfolio share of 
foreign assets by investors, and not just a portfolio adjustment following a reduction 
in wealth. 
 
                                                 
4 We focus on the data since 1999 as a break in the data limits the comparability with 1983-1998 figures. 
The total amounts of bank claims on a locational basis, consolidated-immediate borrower basis, and 
consolidated-ultimate risk basis are not comparable because of differences in the number of counties 
reporting these banking statistics to the BIS. The figure is highest for locational banking statistics (over 40 
countries) and lowest for consolidated, ultimate basis statistics.  
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•  The overall decline in capital flows during the crisis was not uniform over time, but 
went through three distinct phases. 
 
•  The decline in capital flows was heterogeneous across countries and regions, with the 
collapse in capital flows being more temporary for emerging markets. 
 
•  The decline in capital flows was heterogeneous across different categories of flows, 
with international bank lending showing the biggest pullback. 
 
•  International banking activity contracted both in terms of cross-border lending and in 
terms of operations through foreign affiliates, with the magnitude being more 
pronounced for cross-border operations. 
 
•  Prompt and substantial interventions by domestic authorities and international 
organizations cushioned the macroeconomic impact of the contraction in capital 
flows. Interventions took the form of swaps between central banks, use of foreign 
reserves, and lending from multilateral institutions such as the IMF as well as the 
European Union. 
 
Shift towards domestic assets 
 
Asset prices have experienced sharp falls during the crisis, a development that has 
been spread across various types of assets and across countries. To the extent that capital 
flows are proportional to wealth, such a reduction would naturally have led to a fall in 
flows. This, however, offers only a partial account of the recent pattern of flows. The 
crisis has instead been associated with a reduction of the share of assets invested abroad, 
i.e. an increase in the degree of home bias in investor’s portfolios. 
 
The retrenchment towards domestic assets is illustrated in the bottom panel of 
Figure 3 which shows the change in the share of wealth invested abroad between the end 
of 2007 and the end of 2009. Most countries experienced a reduction in this portfolio 
share, or stabilization after years of increases prior to the crisis. This setback in 
international financial integration does not merely reflects movements in asset prices that 
could have lowered the portfolio share even without any action by investors (to the extent 
that asset prices fell by more abroad than domestically). Instead investors have actively 
repatriated funds invested abroad, with the impact of this retrenchment on the portfolio 
share shown by the blue bars in Figure 3.
5 
                                                 
5 The large movements in asset prices and exchange rates during this period imply significant “valuation 
effects.” For example, the share of foreign assets in total assets increased in the United Kingdom despite 
substantial capital repatriation by U.K. residents, because of the large depreciation of the pound during this 
period (foreign assets tend to be denominated in foreign currency, and hence rise in value when the 
domestic currency depreciates).   
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A heterogeneous pattern 
 
While commentators often refer to “the crisis” as a homogeneous global event, a 
closer look reveals substantial heterogeneity along many dimensions—through time, 
across countries, and across types of flows.
6 We document this heterogeneity by focusing 
on quarterly capital flows since the beginning of 2006, shown in Figure 8 for advanced 
countries (top panels) and emerging markets (bottom panels). Outflows and inflows are 
broken down into foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment, bank lending, 
other flows, reserve accumulation (for outflows only) and net derivatives flows. 
 
We split the sample in four distinct periods. The pre-crisis period runs from early 
2006 to the second quarter of 2007. The initial stage of the crisis starts with the outbreak 
of stress in financial markets in the summer of 2007 and runs until the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers at the end of the third quarter of 2008. The collapse stage of the crisis 
runs for two quarters following the fall of Lehman Brothers, while the final recovery 
stage of the crisis covers the last three quarters of 2009. Vertical dotted lines mark the 
various periods. 
 
Capital flows remained resilient in the initial stage of the crisis. Focusing on 
advanced economies, the first signs of stress appear in the second quarter of 2008 
(following the turmoil at Bear Stearns) where advanced countries experience a sharp 
turnaround in gross flows, as investors liquidated foreign holdings and repatriated funds. 
Flows resumed in the 3
rd quarter of 2008, but things changed abruptly with the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, and gross capital flows turned negative for the two subsequent 
quarters as investors repatriated funds invested overseas. The final stage of the crisis saw 
a resumption of capital flows, albeit at levels well short of those observed until mid-2008.  
 
The situation was substantially different in emerging markets. Capital flows 
proved more resilient in the initial phase of the crisis, with only a slowdown during the 
Bear Stearns episode, as opposed to an actual turnaround. While the collapse stage of the 
crisis led to a pullback of capital flows to and from emerging markets, this proved 
shorter-lived than the one for advanced economies. Flows to and from emerging markets 
already bounced back in the first semester of 2009, and then rapidly rose to levels only 
moderately below the ones observed before the crisis. 
 
Turning to the composition of flows, international bank lending (red bars) played 
a dominant role. The retrenchment of flows in advanced economies in the second quarter 
                                                 
6 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) and Rose and Spiegel (2010) document a sizable heterogeneity in the 
magnitudes of the recession.  
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of 2009 was driven by banks. While the pullback in the collapse stage of the crisis is 
observed across various types of investments, bank flows show by large the largest 
retrenchment. In addition, banks have continued reducing their cross-border exposure in 
advanced economies even in the final recovery stage. 
 
Although banking flows also played a major role during the collapse stage in 
emerging markets, their magnitude remains relatively small compared to other types of 
flows. Capital inflows to emerging markets took mainly the form of FDI and portfolio 
investment, which quickly resumed after the collapse. On the outflows side, the 
accumulation of foreign reserves plays a dominant role. In the collapse stage, emerging 
countries dipped in their war chest so that the sudden stop in inflows could be met by 
using reserves instead of having the economy go through a costly shift in the net external 
balance. 
 
A finer geographical breakdown is given in charts 9 and 10 for advanced 
countries and emerging markets, respectively. While international bank lending was the 
main driver of the turnaround of flows in the United States, its role was substantially 
more pronounced in Europe, and especially in the United Kingdom, reflecting its nature 
as an international banking center.
7 The retrenchment of banks from foreign markets has 
also proved more persistent in Europe than in the United States, where bank outflows and 
inflows have moderately resumed in the recovery stage. 
 
Flows to and from emerging markets show marked regional differences. Flows 
have quickly resumed for Latin America and emerging Asia, nearly reaching pre-crisis 
levels. By contrast, flows to and from emerging Europe—the region hit hardest by the 
crisis—remain at a very low level in the recovery stage of the crisis. 
 
International banking in the crisis 
 
International bank lending has retreated markedly during the crisis. The value of 
cross-border claims fell from 59 percent of world GDP at the end of 2007 to 51 percent in 
December 2009 (figure 5). This contraction was driven by sharp retrenchment in bank 
capital flows, an aspect that is concisely shown in figure 6 which averages flows across 
quarters in each of the three crisis stages. In advanced economies, banks pulled back from 
their foreign investment during the collapse stage, and have continued doing so in the 
recovery stage. Non-bank flows by contrast bounced back once the worst stage of the 
crisis passed. Bank flows to and from emerging markets show a similar pattern, but their 
share of overall flows being much more limited than in advanced economies, they had 
only a moderate impact on overall flows. 
                                                 
7 Flows for Switzerland also show a predominance of banking.  
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As discussed in the previous section, cross-border lending is only one channel 
through which banks invest in other countries, and the use of local affiliates also plays a 
large role. While banks pulled back from international activities across the board, they 
did so to a lesser extent on their affiliates business. The affiliates’ share of total claims 
rose slightly between 2007 and 2009 (by 1 and 1.8 percentage points in claims on 
developed and developing countries, respectively, on an ultimate risk basis). Table 1 
shows that banks’ claims on developed economies were reduced primarily through cross-
border lending, to a lesser extent through affiliate lending in foreign currency, and even 
less to affiliate lending in local currency.
8 While cross-border lending to developing 




Policy response to the retrenchment 
 
Policy makers did not remain idle in the face of the collapse of capital flows. 
Charts 8 and 10 show that emerging countries used their foreign exchange reserves to 
offset the drying up of capital inflows, thereby limiting the impact on the economy. 
Central banks also reacted to stress in international bank lending by setting up currency 
swaps between each other. As the crisis started, it quickly became apparent that European 
banks needed to raise liquidity in U.S. dollars to fund their (primarily long-term) holdings 
in the United States (BIS 2009). Prior to the crisis, these banks had relied on short-term 
dollar funding by issuing commercial paper. However, this channel of financing dried up 
as money market mutual funds, the main purchasers of commercial paper, curtailed their 
purchases because of concerns about the banks’ assets financed through this channel 
(which include holdings of mortgage-backed securities) and banks’ health more 
generally. They couldn’t obtain funding from the Federal Reserve, and the central bank in 
their country could only extend loans in local currency. The Federal Reserve lent dollar 
to the foreign central banks so they could in turn lend them to their own banks. These 
swaps arrangements were set up in the initial stage of the crisis, reaching over USD 50 
billion in the summer 2008 (Board of Governors 2009, Goldberg, Kennedy and Miu 
2010). The scale of the swap efforts surged in the wake of the Lehman Brothers failure, 
reaching US 500 billion at the end of 2008. As markets functioning returns to normal, the 
swaps were not renewed and had essentially expired by the end of 2009. Goldberg, 
Kennedy and Miu (2010) find that these arrangements were successful in reducing the 
strain in dollar funding.  
                                                 
8 The rate of contraction is smaller for affiliate lending in local currency (-2.2 percent, immediate borrower 
basis) that for overall affiliate lending (-3.7 percent, ultimate risk basis). 
9 The rate of growth is smaller for affiliate lending in local currency (+2.5 percent, immediate borrower 
basis) that for overall affiliate lending (+3.8 percent, ultimate risk basis).  
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Multilateral institutions were also actively involved. The European Union 
extended loans to Eastern European countries to help them offset the stop of funding 
from foreign investors. Similarly, the IMF set up assistance programs to a broad range of 
countries. During the collapse stage of the crisis the IMF extended over US$53 billion in 
credit in the form of stand-by arrangements (table 2), adding an extra US$26 billion in 
the recovery stage. This assistance was put to use with US$48 billion being still 
outstanding at the end of the first quarter of 2010. Additional support was provided 
through contingent financing in the form of the so-called “Flexible Credit Line.”  
 
IV.   INTERPRETING THE CRISIS 
The unprecedented global crisis has stimulated a burgeoning literature analyzing 
its causes and consequences. While many of the papers have focused on financial sector 
vulnerabilities, a number of others have looked more generally at how the global 
financial crisis has affected capital flows and economic activity across the globe. With 
regard to capital flows in advanced economies, Bertaut and Pounder (2009) highlight the 
important role played by banks in U.S. capital flows during the crisis (including through 
the activity of European banks vis-à-vis their U.S. affiliates). While the crisis period was 
generally characterized by flight to safety away from risky securities, the pull-back in 
portfolio flows was relatively small compared to the large valuation losses due to the 
large asset price fluctuations. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) assess supply shocks to bank 
lending in the crisis, and find a sizable transmission through cross-border lending, 
lending through affiliates (use of internal market to direct funds to the parent) and an 
impact on local banks. They also find that the so-called “Vienna initiative” designed to 
maintain lines of bank credit to countries in Central and Eastern Europe helped, a result 
corroborated by the findings of Barba-Navaretti et al. (2010). Another policy response to 
the crisis was the activation of large swap lines between major central banks. For 
example, Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010) document the use of U.S. swap lines, and 
argue that they were effective at reducing dollar funding pressures and the stress in dollar 
money markets. 
 
With regard to emerging market economies, authors such as Ghosh et al. (2009) 
and Blanchard et al. (2010) have underscored how these were affected by an external 
trade shock, the result of the collapse in domestic demand in advanced economies, and by 
a “sudden stop” in capital inflows, resulting from substantial deleveraging by financial 
institutions in the context of a generalized “flight to safety.”
10 In principle, large holdings 
                                                 
10 It is well-known that emerging-market exposure to U.S. securities backed by sub-prime mortgages was 
very modest. However, Kamin and Pounder (2010) find that direct exposure to U.S. mortgages does not 
explain the geographical pattern of the crisis. Instead, what matters is a global risk aversion shock, which 
affected most severely institutions dependent on short-term funding.  
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of foreign exchange reserves could have helped cushion the shock, by reducing the need 
for a large current account adjustment through demand compression in response to 
declining inflows. Findings on this issue are not fully clear-cut. Obstfeld et al. (2009) 
fined evidence that countries with large reserves faced less exchange rate pressure. 
However, Blanchard et al. (2010) do not find evidence that countries with large reserves 
suffered milder recessions.  
 
Other papers have focused on the factors explaining the cross-country incidence 
of the crisis (measured in terms of output and demand contraction, exchange rate 
depreciation, and/or asset price changes). Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010) stress 
how the crisis hit more severely countries with weaker credit market regulation. Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2010) highlight how output and especially demand contractions were 
sharper in countries with large pre-crisis current account deficits and fast pre-crisis credit 
growth; Rose and Spiegel (2010), while more skeptical about the ability of pre-crisis 
variables in explaining crisis outcomes, also find that countries with large current account 
deficits—as well as more deregulated financial markets—experienced deeper recessions.  
 
Our general reading of the literature points to two key themes: first, the incidence 
of the crisis is related to the financial excesses (asset price bubbles, dramatic compression 
of spreads, lax financial regulation etc) and associated macroeconomic imbalances and 
vulnerabilities (such as large current account deficits) that built up before the crisis; and 
second, international financial linkages were important in explaining the cross-border 
transmission of the crisis. In the remainder of this section, we articulate testable 
hypotheses that we then confront to the data.  
 
Stepping back from the crisis, understanding the determinants of international 
capital flows has long been a prominent topic for economists. A detailed review of the 
literature is beyond the scope of this paper, we can point for instance to the role of 
institutions in shaping the magnitude and form of international capital flows (see for 
instance Fatih Ekinci et al. 2007), with foreign investors being more willing to take a 
long-term view in countries with better functioning institutions. However, our focus is 
not on the level and composition of capital flows, but on their changes during a time of 
crisis. 
 
Our question is related to the extensive literature on “sudden stops” which 
considers the causes and consequences of abrupt dry-ups of external funding in emerging 
markets. The literature finds that both financial integration, in terms of its magnitude and 
specific form, and domestic conditions play a role. Calvo et al (2008) document that 
sudden stops are more likely for countries which rely more on short-term funding from 
banks or portfolio investment than on foreign direct investment. A high reliance of 
liabilities in foreign currency is also a factor of risk. The magnitude of integration has a 
non-monotonous effect: countries that are moderately integrated are at greater risk that  
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countries that either have only shallow financial links with the rest of the world, or are 
extensively integrated. Countries with larger public deficits are also more at risk of a 
sudden stop. Kaminsky (2008) argues that a higher extent of financial integration raises 
the risk of a sudden stop, even in the absence of domestic problems. Edwards (2004) 
finds that sudden stops are more likely for countries with large current account deficits, a 
credit boom, or low foreign reserves.  
 
To understand the behavior of capital flows during the crisis we need to be 
specific about the nature of the underlying shock. We argue that the collapse of capital 
flows reflected a large “risk aversion” shock—including aspects of a short-run “liquidity 
panic” and a more lasting re-assessment of macroeconomic and financial sector risk. The 
global nature of the shock accounts for the unprecedented degree of international 
comovements (as documented by Imbs 2010). Accordingly, we start our empirical 
analysis with an assessment of the link between volatility and global capital flows. Table 
2 presents results from a very simple regression of global capital flows (scaled by world 
GDP) on a measure of “risk”, which we proxy with the VIX index of implied volatility 
on the S&P 500. We also control for global growth, which can be expected to boost 
capital flows, and openness to trade (the ratio of world exports plus imports to GDP) as 
trade in financial assets can be expected to move in step with trade in goods. The signs of 
the various regression coefficients are as expected: capital flows are higher when risk is 
low, growth is high, and international integration deeper. The significance of risk shows 
some sensitivity to the sample. Its significance is weak when we consider the whole 
sample from 1993 Q1 to 2009 Q4, but increases once we drop the early years of the 
sample where the extent of financial integration was more limited. 
 
The shock on risk aversion can affect capital flows through three broad channels. 
First, the re-assessment of risk is likely to lead investors to retrench more from countries 
with vulnerable conditions. Before the crisis risk appetite was high and all countries were 
treated benignly. With higher risk aversion we would expect the countries with the 
weakest fundamentals and higher exposure to financial sector to be most severely 
affected by a pull-back in capital flows. In this context, it is informative to look not only 
at the decline in flows during the acute phase of the crisis (the last quarter of 2008 and the 
first quarter of 2009) but also at the subsequent period (the last 3 quarters of 2009) during 
which the “liquidity run” was arguably over. In practice, we test whether the capital flow 
retrenchment was deeper for countries with weak external fundamentals (net external 
debt; net external liabilities; current account deficits, weak credit market regulation), as 
well as for those more vulnerable to a liquidity shock (countries with large gross 
liabilities; countries with larger bank positions). 
11  
                                                 
11 Weak regulation is particularly important if we think that under more laisser-faire the potential for 
asymmetric information is larger.  
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The risk aversion shock can also play very differently across types of investment. 
Arguably, foreign direct investment is more long-term in nature: while it would clearly be 
affected by a reassessment of medium-term prospects for the economy, it is less 
vulnerable to concerns about liquidity. Banking flows on the other hand are likely to be 
most sensitive to the shock. The maturity and liquidity mismatch that characterizes banks 
leaves them open to bank runs. Banks operated with a thin capital cushion before the 
crisis, and the losses they faced raised the specter of default, leading investors (including 
other banks) to pull back as they couldn’t assess the banks’ solvency with enough 
confidence. “Other” flows (which include non-bank financial institutions) can also be 
expected to be substantially affected by the shock. Portfolio investment represents an 
intermediate case. While it has a shorter focus than FDI, it is not as vulnerable to liquidity 
and counterparty concerns as bank lending is. In light of this, we would expect 
retrenchment to be larger for bank flows, less so for portfolio, even less so for FDI—as 
indeed our analysis of the composition of capital flows in Section III suggests. 
 
Second, countries with domestic vulnerabilities are likely to be seen as more risky 
by foreign investors. For instance, a credit-fuelled boom can lead to imbalances, such as 
excessive indebtedness, that are overlooked during the boom period, but lead to a sharp 
re-assessment once risk appetite is lower. The crisis has also led to a weakening of 
growth prospects and the fiscal situation in many countries, which can lead investors to 
view them as riskier than previously and limit their investment in these countries. 
 
Finally, the risk aversion shock led to a sharp contraction in investment and a 
collapse of global trade, which consists primarily of durable goods and commodities. The 
sharp recession of the world economy also led to a fall in commodity prices. Countries 
where manufacturing accounts for a large share of GDP, that rely on commodity exports, 
or whose trading partners’ experience weak growth, are thus more likely to have been 
adversely affected.  
 
V.   AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE DRIVERS OF CAPITAL FLOWS 
As discussed in the previous section, we see the crisis as resulting in a dramatic 
re-assessment by investors of macroeconomic imbalances and financial vulnerabilities in 
different countries. Accordingly, we investigate more formally whether variables 
capturing these pre-crisis factors help explain the “sudden stop” in capital flows 
associated with the post-Lehman stage of the financial crisis, as well as the behavior of 
flows during the most recent recovery period (the last three quarters of 2009).  
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where  [ ] 2 1     , t t flows capital Annualized c k −  is the annualized value of capital flows in 
category k for country c for the period t1 to t2. We choose to scale the reduction of 
international capital flows by the country’s GDP in order to capture the macroeconomic 
relevance of capital flows. An alternative would be to scale flows by initial positions, but 
we do not think this accurately reflects the extent of economic strain. For instance, a 
country where foreign investors pulled out half of their holdings, but where these 
holdings account for a small share of GDP, does not suffer much from the collapse in 
funding. By contrast, a country where investors liquidate a quarter of their holdings, but 
where these holding account for 100 percent of GDP, experiences a severe cutoff in its 
funding. 
 
We consider gross capital inflows, gross capital outflows, as well as net capital 
flows (the difference between inflows and outflows). We also consider gross flows with 
and without official flows, such as reserve accumulation or support from multilateral 
organizations. Focusing only on overall flows, we would infer that a country with a large 
inflow in the form of IMF support faced benign conditions, which clearly would be 
inaccurate. We present results for different samples (all countries, advanced economies, 
and emerging markets).
12 We proceed in two steps. We first contrast the countries where 
the turnaround of flows was largest with the countries where it was smallest. We then 
proceed to a formal econometric analysis of the retrenchment of flows in the cross-
section of countries. While more rigorous, this second step limits the numbers of 
variables we can consider without lowering the degrees of freedom to an unacceptably 
low level. 
 
A.   Stylized facts 
We start the analysis by establishing some aggregate “stylized facts” on the 
relation between the cross-country incidence of the contraction in capital flows and a set 
                                                 
12 Results for an alternative base going until the collapse stage (2006.1 -2008.3, instead  of 2006.1-2007.2) 
are similar, and are available from the authors.  
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of pre-crisis and crisis variables. Our pre-crisis variables can be regrouped in three broad 
categories outlined above. 
 
The first group of variables reflects international financial exposure and captures 
the extent and nature of countries’ financial integration with the rest of the world. As 
highlighted by the narrative of the previous sections, we focus on variables that help 
capture two of the salient aspects of the global financial turmoil, namely a generalized 
deleveraging and an increase in home bias, and a global increase in risk aversion. We 
proxy the former with the size of a country’s external balance sheet (the sum of its 
external assets and liabilities), separating out debt instruments, conceivably more affected 
by the crisis, from equity instruments, such as FDI and portfolio equity. This is motivated 
by the fact that contingent assets and liabilities, such as FDI and equity, offer better 
opportunities of risk sharing than non-contingent assets such as bonds or bank loans. For 
example, countries with large international banking sectors are likely to be most severely 
affected by the turmoil in global banking. As for the global increase in risk aversion, this 
would in principle have a more severe effect on the countries that rely more heavily on 
foreign saving. We proxy for this through the country’s net foreign asset position, and 
also break it down into equity and debt sub-components. We also split debt holdings 
between bonds and banks on the one hand and foreign reserves on the other hand, as the 
latter can be expected to be seen as a source of strength by investors, making them less 
inclined to cut their funding to the country. Importantly, all “external balance sheet” 
variables are dated as of end-2005, and therefore prior to the pre-crisis period we 
consider.  
 
The second set of pre-crisis variables is related to the country’s macroeconomic 
characteristics, both in terms of pre-crisis conditions and in terms of developments 
during the crisis. The first variable reflecting initial conditions is the growth of GDP in 
the two years before the crisis (2005-2007), as we can expect investors to be more likely 
to cut funding to countries with weaker growth. The second is the country’s level of 
development, proxied by the log of per capita GDP. The coefficient on this variable is 
ambiguous ex ante: while richer countries are likely to be seen as safer investment 
opportunities, and thus less likely to suffer a capital flow turnaround, they also have been 
the hardest hit by the contraction in world GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2010). Turning 
to developments during the crisis, the first variable is the change in GDP growth in the 
country between the crisis and the pre-crisis period. The second is the change in GDP 
growth in a country’s trading partners between the crisis and the pre-crisis period. 
Countries whose trading partners were more affected by the crisis may experience larger 
pull-backs of foreign capital (to the extent that countries most severely affected need to 
repatriate capital) and also reduce their outflows by more (in light of worsened prospects 
in trading partners). 
13 The third variable is the change in growth projections for the 
                                                 
13 We would ideally want to identify financial trading partners. In practice, there is a strong correlation 
between the composition of goods and asset trade. Furthermore, establishing the pattern of bilateral 
financial linkages is complicated by the large role of international financial centers in global asset trade, 
which obscures the nature of the ultimate borrower or lender in international financial statistics.  
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country for the period 2009-2012 resulting from the crisis. Pre-crisis growth projections 
for that period are taken from the April 2007 World Economic Outlook (WEO) and post-
crisis projections from the April 2009 WEO. The last two variables capture changes in 
countries’ fiscal prospects as a result of the crisis. Growing fiscal deficits and 
deteriorating public debt dynamics will reduce the attractiveness of domestic bonds for 
foreign investors. The fiscal balance variable is defined as the difference in WEO 
projections for the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP in 2012 between the April 2009 and 
the April 2007 WEO. Similarly, the change in projected public debt dynamics is defined 
as the difference between the April 2009 and April 2007 WEO projections for gross 
government debt in the year 2012.  
 
The third set of pre-crisis variables are more closely related to international trade, 
and can have an impact on capital flows both directly but also indirectly, through their 
effects on a country’s export revenues. The first variable is an economy’ openness to 
international trade (the sum of imports and exports over GDP), the most obvious proxy 
for vulnerability to a global slowdown. The second such variable is the share of 
manufacturing in GDP. As widely documented (see, for example, Bems et al., 2010) the 
collapse in world trade in late 2008 has hit hardest countries more reliant on 
manufacturing activity. The sign on this variable is a priori ambiguous: on the one hand, 
a higher share of manufacturing may imply a more drastic contraction in export revenues, 
which could be reflected in lower acquisitions of foreign assets. On the other, it may 
reduce foreign demand for the country’s assets, and hence a reduction in capital inflows. 
Finally, given the heavy presence of emerging markets in our sample, we also include the 
commodity trade balance as a ratio of GDP, which captures more generally the 
magnitude of the country’s reliance on primary exports, whose prices fell sharply during 
the crisis. We generally consider these variables as likely to play a more important role in 
explaining the change in capital flows for emerging economies than for advanced ones. 
 
Our “stylized facts” are constructed as follows. We divide our country sample 
into two groups, each comprising around a quarter of the sample: the countries where the 
decline in capital flows was smallest, and those that suffered the largest declines (the 
“sudden stop” group). We then compare mean and median values of a set of pre-crisis 
and crisis variables and indicators between the two samples. The sample excludes a set of 
international financial centers for which changes in inflows and outflows are very 
strongly correlated, reflecting these countries’ role as international financial 
intermediaries, and take extreme values. 
14 We also exclude the smallest countries (those 
with GDP below US$20 billion). 
 
Table 4 presents the differences in mean and median values of the indicators 
mentioned above between countries that experienced small declines in inflows and 
                                                 
14 The countries are Belgium, Cyprus, Hong Kong S.A.R., Iceland, Ireland, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Panama,  Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  
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countries that experienced large ones, as well as a t-test for the equality of means.
15 As 
discussed above, the decline in inflows is scaled by the country’s GDP to capture its 
macroeconomic relevance. The first line highlights the very large difference in the 
change in inflows (netting out official flows such as IMF lending) between the two 
samples. The sudden stop countries faced a reduction of inflows that was larger by about 
30 percent of GDP on an annualized basis, relative to the countries that experienced a 
small reduction.
16 Also, the second line shows that declines in inflows and outflows 
generally went together. 
 
Turning to the financial exposure measures, there is strong evidence that countries 
with larger gross external positions, particularly in debt instruments, suffered more severe 
declines in inflows. Also, countries whose banks had a more negative net external 
position, or with an overall external position vis-à-vis BIS banks, suffered more severe 
declines in inflows, a result consistent with the literature discussion on the central role 
played by banks in advanced economies in the financial crisis.  
 
Among the variables related to macroeconomic characteristics, we find that 
declines in capital inflows were larger in countries with higher GDP per capita, a result 
reminiscent of the findings in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) and Rose and Spiegel 
(2010) that output and demand declines were more severe in richer countries. The 
deterioration of public finances also played a role, as countries larger debts and worsened 
public deficits faced a larger reversal in flows. Finally, countries with a more acute 
weakening of growth during the crisis, or worsened growth prospects, also suffered more. 
 
International trade variables also mattered. Countries more open to international 
trade suffered larger declines in inflows. A weakening of growth in trading partners is 
also associated with a more pronounced reduction in flows.  
 
Table 5 presents the corresponding results for capital outflows. Overall, results 
are similar to those presented in Table 4 for inflows: countries with higher GDP per 
capita, larger gross positions, more negative positions vis-à-vis BIS-reporting banks, and 
with a worsened fiscal outlook and larger growth declines at home and in trading partners 
saw a larger compression in total capital outflows. The results also suggest that declines 
in capital outflows were larger in countries with less regulated credit markets.  
 
While the results from contrasting country samples are broadly consistent with the 
theoretical priors discussed in the previous sections, we acknowledge that the 
interpretation of these findings needs to be taken with some caution in light of the strong 
                                                 
15 Specifically, the table show the value of the variables in the countries with small declines in flows , 
minus the values of countries with large declines. 
16 Specifically, the mean change in inflows net of official was -0.6 percent of GDP in the countries with the 
smallest decline, and -34.0 percent in the countries with the largest declines, leading to a relative change of  
inflows by -0.6 – ( - 34.0) = 33.4 percent of GDP.  
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correlation between some of the variables in the sample (for example, GDP per capita 
and all measures of financial openness). We therefore turn to a more formal multivariate 
regression analysis to separate the influence of various drivers, at the cost of limiting the 
number of variables we can consider in order to preserve the degrees of freedom. We first 
contrast capital flows during the collapse stage of the crisis (2008 Q4 – 2009 Q1) relative 
to the ones prior to the crisis (2006 Q1 – 2007 Q2), and then consider the flows in the 
recovery stage of the crisis (2009 Q2 – 2009 Q4). 
 
B.   Multivariate regression analysis: collapse stage of the crisis 
Our econometric analysis first considers the change in gross capital inflows, 
before turning to gross outflows, and finally focusing more specifically on banking flows. 
We present results for the whole sample, as well for advanced economies and emerging 
markets separately. We adopt a parsimonious specification, particularly so for the 
advanced economies regressions, in light of the limited number of observations. Our 
choice of variables is guided by the results presented in Tables 4-5. Relative to the 
variables considered in those tables, we omit those that refer to the crisis period, with the 
exception of growth in trading partners. While there seems to be a clear link between the 
behavior of flows during the crisis and the re-assessment of growth and fiscal prospects 
in each country, there are thorny endogeneity and causality issues. For example, revisions 
to public debt dynamics and worsened output prospects reflect factors such as the 
bursting of bubbles, financial sector losses, as well as changes in global risk aversion and 
external financing conditions. These problems are arguably less severe for changes in 
growth in trading partners, with the exception of “large” economies (and hence we 
exclude this variable from the advanced-country regressions). 
 
Table 6 shows the results when the dependent variable is the change in gross 
inflows during the sudden stop, relative to the value of inflows before the crisis. Results 
are reported for total capital inflows (columns 1-3), simply for illustrative purposes, as 
well as for inflows excluding official lending through IMF programs, other official loans 
to the government (such as lending by the European Union to Hungary and Latvia), and 
borrowing by the central bank—for example through swap lines (columns 4-6). As 
discussed above, the rationale for excluding these flows is that they capture the response 
of official institutions to the crisis. The dependent variable is the ratio of the change in 
flows to GDP in percentage points (so a value of -5 indicates a reduction by 5 percent of 
GDP). Financial exposure variables are measured in percent. The coefficient of -9.08 on 
gross debt in column 4 then indicates that a country with an extra 10 percent of GDP in 
gross assets and liabilities in debt instruments saw a larger reduction of inflows by 0.1 x 
9.08 = 0.9 percent of GDP. 
 
When official flows is included (columns 1-3), we find evidence of a sharper 
decline in inflows in advanced economies with larger gross debt positions and in 
emerging markets with a high ratio of private credit to GDP, but no link between the 
country’s net debt position and the decline in inflows. Once we exclude official flows 
(column 4-onwards), results show clearly that the sudden stop in capital inflows was 
more severe for countries with a larger size of gross positions in debt instruments (a  
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negative coefficient on the “gross debt assets + liabilities” variable) and, for emerging 
markets, larger net liabilities in debt instruments (a positive coefficient on the “net debt 
assets” variable), which is in line with the priors discussed in section IV.
17 The effects are 
statistically and economically significant: for example, other things being equal, an 
emerging market country with a pre-crisis net position in debt instruments (securities, 
loans, deposits etc) stronger by 10 percentage points of GDP experienced a reduction in 
flows about 3 percentage points of GDP smaller. It is also interesting to note that higher 
pre-crisis reserve holdings are not associated with a smaller decline in inflows—if 
anything, the opposite is true (even though the coefficient is not precisely estimated). 
This result can be explained by the fact that countries used foreign exchange reserves to 
limit the need for drastic corrections in net flows—the reduction in reserves allowed 
other sectors to access foreign exchange and reduce external liabilities, implying a 
reduction in capital inflows.
18 For the emerging market sample, we also find that the 
decline in inflows was larger in countries with faster pre-crisis growth, higher GDP per 
capita, higher pre-crisis private credit. The coefficient on growth in trading partners 
during the crisis period has the expected positive sign (faster growth in trading partners 
associated with a smaller decline in inflows) but the coefficient is not precisely estimated. 
We find little evidence of a systematic impact of pre-crisis growth, level of development, 
and trade-related variables on the extent of the decline in capital inflows.  
 
We present an analogous set of results for capital outflows in Table 7, with 
columns (1)-(3) reporting results using the change in total capital outflows as the 
dependent variable and columns (4)-(6) presenting results for the change in capital 
outflows excluding official flows (such as reserve accumulation and changes in monetary 
authorities’ claims vis-à-vis nonresidents). The specification is slightly different relative 
to the one for capital inflows. In particular, given the presence of some oil exporters in 
our sample and the dramatic decline in oil prices during the crisis period, we include 
among the explanatory variables a dummy for oil exporters. Our results show some 
differences between advanced economies and emerging markets. In particular, for 
advanced economies there is strong evidence of a larger decline in outflows when pre-
crisis gross cross-border debt positions were large (the coefficient on the “gross debt 
assets + liabilities” variable is more negative and statistically significant for the advanced 
economies’ sample), which drives the significance of the gross debt variable in the whole 
sample regression. For emerging markets the evidence suggests a much sharper decline in 
outflows in oil-exporting countries, but no robust relation between the size of capital 
outflows and other explanatory variables.  
 
                                                 
17 The “Net debt assets” variable is the country’s net position in debt instruments (securities, loans, deposits 
etc), with a positive value indicating that it is a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the world in these 
instruments. The positive coefficients in table 4 thus indicate, for example, that countries that were net 
creditors experienced a smaller decline in inflows compared to net debtors. 
18 Remember that capital inflows are net acquisitions by nonresidents of claims on domestic residents. 
Hence if a domestic firm repays a foreign loan the transaction is recorded as a negative capital inflow.   
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In Table 8 we focus more specifically on gross and net banking inflows, relating 
them to gross and net banking positions as well as to a parsimonious set of pre-crisis 
variables (GDP per capita, output growth, oil dummy) and, for emerging markets, the 
change in growth rate for trading partners during the crisis period relative to the pre-crisis 
period. The results suggest that emerging economies with larger gross bank debt 
positions and more negative net bank debt positions suffered a sharper decline in gross 
and net banking inflows. Also, for emerging markets faster pre-crisis growth is associated 
with a sharper decline in gross and net inflows. For advanced economies, for which two-
way banking flows are dominant, we find a sharper contraction in total flows for 
countries with larger gross bank positions. The pattern for net banking flows is similar to 
the one for emerging markets, but the estimates are not statistically significant. Estimates 
relying on a more complete advanced economies sample that includes financial centers 
(results available from the authors) point to a positive and statistically significant relation 
between the net bank position at end-2005 and the change in net banking inflows during 
the crisis period, again in line with our priors. 
 
C.   Multivariate regression analysis: recovery stage of the crisis 
We turn now to examining the patterns of flows during the last 3 quarters of 2009, 
again relative to the pre-crisis period. Considering this period after the height of the crisis 
allows us to establish whether some of the patterns we identified in the previous sub-
section are primarily related to the global panic following the events of September 2008, 
or whether they persist during the recovery stage.  
 
Table 9 presents the results for the decline in capital inflows, and is constructed 
along similar lines as table 6. Results are broadly consistent to those we obtained for the 
crisis period—in particular, the decline in inflows is larger for countries with larger gross 
debt positions and slower growth in trading partners, but there is no statistically 
significant correlation between pre-crisis net debt positions.  
 
Table 10 presents the results for capital outflows. Again, results are similar to 
those obtained for the crisis period, with a sharper contraction in outflows for countries 
with larger gross debt positions. Not surprisingly, in light of the recovery in oil prices, the 
size and statistical significance of the oil dummy coefficient is reduced relative to the 
crisis-period regressions. It is also interesting to contrast the size of the coefficient on the 
initial stock of foreign exchange reserves in the emerging market regressions in Tables 7 
and 10. The coefficient on reserves is negative in the collapse stage (albeit imprecisely 
estimated) consistent with central banks in high-reserve countries selling reserves to 
offset the impact of a decline in capital inflows. The coefficient however becomes 
positive and small in the recovery stage, as many emerging markets rebuilt their stock of 
reserves as capital inflows resumed.  
 
Table 11 presents the result for banking flows. Results are similar to the ones for 
the collapse stage: in particular, emerging markets with higher net external bank debt pre- 
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crisis still show larger gross and net declines in bank inflows. The evidence also suggests 
sharper declines in gross and net bank inflows in oil exporters, a result consistent with the 
recovery in oil export prices relative to the crisis period reducing the need for external 
finance.  
 
Overall, our simple econometric analysis finds evidence for an impact of 
international financial exposure on the behavior of international capital flows. Countries 
with large holdings of debt and bank positions saw a larger contraction in capital inflows 
during the crisis, as well as in the immediate post-crisis period. Also, countries with a 
stronger net external position in debt instruments being less affected by the turnaround of 
capital flows. Macroeconomic conditions and the exposure to international trade also play 
a role, especially for emerging economies. The decline in inflows has been larger in 
countries with higher GDP per capita and faster pre-crisis growth rates, as well as those 
whose trading partners suffered steeper declines in growth rates relative to the pre-crisis 
period. Trends in oil prices are important in explaining capital outflows from emerging 
markets. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 
Our analysis of the patterns of capital flows during the financial crisis stresses 
common elements, as well as several dimensions of heterogeneity. We document how the 
crisis evolved in distinct stages, with capital flows collapsing only in the wake of the 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. Emerging and developed economies fared very 
differently, with many emerging markets experiencing only a temporary, albeit sharp, 
disruption in international capital flows. The diversity of experiences across countries can 
be linked to the size of gross and net external exposures, and particularly to the reliance 
on debt instruments and the importance of bank cross-border activity.  
 
With regard to the questions raised in the introduction, the evidence points to the 
following answers:  
 
What lies behind the retrenchment” in capital flows? Primarily the dramatic 
contraction in cross-border banking activity and global deleveraging, including by 
nonbank financial institutions. The contraction in flows during the first year of the crisis 
was concentrated among banking flows. These flows also played a prominent role during 
the collapse stage.  
 
Did flows fall evenly across countries and categories of flows? No. Emerging 
markets were essentially spared until the collapse stage. Even then, some recovered in 
short order after the crisis, whereas flows in other regions still remain well below the pre-
crisis levels. The contraction in flows was concentrated in banking flows, with smaller 
declines in portfolio investment and especially FDI.  
 
Can we link the intensity of the retrenchment to financial and macroeconomic 
characteristics of countries? Yes for financial characteristics: countries with high degrees 
of financial integration through debt and banking were more affected, and countries with  
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large net liabilities in debt instruments suffered sharper declines in capital inflows. While 
it is more difficult to pinpoint a strong systematic relation between the magnitude of the 
capital flow retrenchment and other pre-crisis macroeconomic conditions, the evidence 
suggests that the decline in capital inflows was linked to the extent of downward 
revisions to the growth and fiscal outlook, as well as to growth declines in trading 
partners. For emerging markets, the evidence also suggests a link between trade and 
capital flows operating through the impact of commodity prices on export revenues.  
 
Is the trend towards rising financial globalization over? Of course we do not know 
whether the trends we have highlighted will gradually unwind as the world economy 
recovers, or whether the crisis of 2008-09 will mark a watershed in the evolution of 
international capital flows. Still, relying on the main features of growing cross-border 
capital flows discussed in Section II we provide some (necessarily speculative) views on 
whether the impact of the crisis on those underlying factors is likely to be long-lasting.  
 
1.       “Financial deepening” within countries, reflected in sizable increases in financial 
balance sheets (both domestic and cross-border). The process may well suffer a setback 
in advanced economies for several reasons: a potentially reduced use of securitization;  
limits on large and complex financial institutions; the impact of declines in the valuation 
of nonfinancial assets, such as real estate, on debt. In the main advanced economies, one 
of the legacies of the crisis is a significant expansion in public sector balance sheets, and 
an important question for the dynamics of cross-border flows will be the role played by 
nonresident investors in financing of this expansion. The past decade saw an 
unprecedented increase in foreign ownership of domestic debt instruments, associated 
first with the massive global increase in foreign exchange reserves by emerging markets, 
which are primarily invested in advanced economies’ government paper; second with the 
advent of the euro, which triggered a sharp increase in demand for government paper 
from other euro area countries; and third with the overall trend towards international 
financial integration. It is an open question whether this trend will be resilient to the 
significant deterioration in fiscal prospects for advanced economies. The scope for 
financial deepening is clearly stronger in emerging markets, but could well take place 
only gradually, particularly given governments’ concerns about ‘financial excesses’ 
following the global crisis.  
2.       Rising international portfolio diversification, reflecting a decline in home bias. 
The scope for portfolio diversification remains significant, particularly for emerging 
markets. On their asset side, the process may be associated with a decline in the role of 
reserve accumulation and an increase in alternative types of flows. On their liability side, 
demand for emerging market assets is likely to increase after the financial crisis, in light 
of the resilience of these countries to the global turmoil on financial markets, their growth 
prospects, and strong macroeconomic fundamentals. However, an open question is 
whether changes in financial regulation in response to the crisis could be associated with 
increasing home bias, particularly for advanced economies.   
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3.       Increased cross-border activity by international financial institutions (including 
for regulatory arbitrage purposes). In the years before the crisis, international banking 
played a major role in the process. Banks in advanced economies were also at the core of 
the turmoil since 2007. First in the initial stage of the crisis, where capital flow disruption 
were essentially limited to banking flows among developed economies, but also in the 
collapse stage as banking flows show the sharpest retrenchment across a broad range of 
countries. Bank flows have also remained lackluster in the final stage of the crisis, with 
continuing retrenchments in many regions. The ongoing efforts aimed at reforming 
banking and financial regulation could also hinder a return to large banking flows. The 
crisis has clearly demonstrated the risks posed by large global financial institutions that 
can be too big to rescue. One of the main themes of reform is then to limit the size of 
banks, which would likely limit their international operations as well. In addition, a big 
question mark relates to the future scope for cross-border financial flows driven by 
regulatory and tax arbitrage considerations, which played a very significant role in the 
expansion of global flows during the pre-crisis period. On the other hand, cross-border 
activity by financial institutions domiciled in emerging markets, which is so far relatively 
limited in comparison to advanced economies, may well increase. These banks have 
weathered the global financial crisis well, also in light of their limited external exposures, 
and have a strong domestic deposit base. The likelihood and size of their cross-border 
expansion is of course dependent on the evolution of their domestic regulatory regimes.  
4.       Increased financial integration within the euro area following EMU, and within 
the European Union more generally. The process has already run its course to a 
significant extent, and the sovereign debt market crisis of early 2010 suggests a decline in 
substitutability between assets issued by different euro area governments and financial 
institutions. At a minimum, we think that this factor is unlikely to provide the same boost 
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Box 1. Concepts and measures of international financial integration 
 
International capital flows are based on the residency criterion of the balance of 
payments, and cover transactions where one of the counterparty is a resident of the 
country (say the euro area) and the other a resident of the rest of the world. Capital 
outflows denote net purchases by domestic residents of financial instruments issued by 
nonresidents, while capital inflows denote net purchases by foreign residents of domestic 
financial instruments. The difference between capital inflows and outflows (the financial 
account balance) is corresponds to the current account balance (up to a statistical 
discrepancy). 
International capital flows (acquisition of claims) and the corresponding stocks 
(value of outstanding claims) are broken down into several categories.  
 
•  Foreign direct investment represents a controlling claim in a company (a stake of 
at least 10 percent), either by the setting up of foreign operations or the 
acquisition of a company abroad by a domestic one.  
•  Portfolio investment covers holdings of bonds and equity that do not lead to a 
controlling stake.  
•  “Other investment” includes a broad residual array of transactions/holdings 
between residents and nonresidents, such as loans and deposits, trade credits etc. 
Within this category, we separate out those transactions or holdings in which the 
domestic counterpart is a bank.  
•  Reserves denote assets held abroad by the country’s government or monetary 
authority, primarily in the form of liquid assets (this category only exists for 
outflows).  
•  Financial derivatives flows are payments and receipts between residents and 
nonresidents related to new or outstanding derivatives positions. In our analysis of 
capital flows, we classify the value of net transactions in financial derivatives on 
the inflows side of the balance of payments. 
While cross-border holdings represent the most prominent form of international 
financial integration, there are other channels of financial exposure. In particular, the 
banks of a country can be exposed to the economic conditions of another either by 
lending directly (banking capital flows) or by having affiliates in the foreign country that 
lend using locally-raised funds. 
Finally, cross-border financial holdings offer a picture of wealth held abroad. 
Their value can be compared with that of residents’ domestic assets, i.e. the claim on a 
resident on another one, to assess the extent to which a country’s residents are 
internationally diversified.  
  30
APPENDIX A: data sources 
 
International capital flows 
 
Capital flows are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of 
Payments Statistics database (‘standard presentation’). Capital flows are measured at a 
quarterly frequency. Our sample consists of 75 economies, which account for 95 percent 
of the world’s GDP. 28 are developed economies: United States, United Kingdom, Euro 
Area (further broken in 16 members: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain), Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland. 47 economies are emerging markets: 13 in Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela), 11 in Asia (China, Hong Kong S.A.R., 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan province of China, 
Thailand, Vietnam), 15 in Europe (Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine) 
and 8 in other regions (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Israel, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Pakistan, South Africa). For China, quarterly flows are calculating by interpolating semi-
annual data from national sources, using quarterly data on the trade balance, foreign 
exchange reserves, and banking flows from the BIS. For Taiwan province of China the 
balance of payments data is obtained from the Central Bank’s website. The only countries 
of global relevance for international capital flows that are not included in our sample are 
large Middle-Eastern oil exporters, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
for which quarterly balance of payments data are not available. 
 
As the crisis saw a substantial use of swap lines between central banks and 
support from multilateral institutions, we break the “other” category further between 
central banks swap lines, IMF lending, and official lending. While the balance of 
payments statistics do not include a specific line for the swaps between central banks, we 
estimates them as the sum of the loans, deposit and other assets by the monetary 
authority, both for gross outflows and inflows. The gross outflows under these categories 
are distinct from exchange rate reserves. Our estimates are consistent with data from the 
major central banks (United States, Switzerland, Euro area). The balance of payments 
data for the United Kingdom do not indicate the capital outflows and inflows linked to 
the monetary authorities. Our estimate for the gross swap inflows are then built based on 
the changes in the “other liabilities” category reported on the Bank of England’s balance 
sheet.  
On the capital inflows side, IMF lending (use of Fund credits and loans) is 
recorded as a liability of monetary authorities, while official lending from other sources 
(for example, EU loans to Hungary and Latvia) are recorded as other investment 
liabilities of the government.  
  31
 
Another adjustment to the data is related to the issuance of IMF Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) to member countries in the 3
rd quarter of 2009, which totaled over $250 
billion. This allocation was recorded as an increase in foreign exchange reserves in that 
quarter, offset by a corresponding increase in the liabilities of monetary authorities. Our 
2009Q3 data on total capital inflows and outflows—as well as on reserve flows and flows 
related to monetary authorities’ transactions—net out the impact of the SDR allocation. 
 
International bank claims 
 
The Bank for International Settlements publishes data on international banks’ 
exposure under two complementary concepts. Data under the locational concept cover 
the international assets and liabilities of all banks located in a country. These banks 
include banks headquartered in the country, as well as affiliates of foreign banks. For 
instance, the Czech subsidiary of a German bank is counted as a Czech entity. These data 
correspond to the residency concept of the balance of payments. 
The consolidated basis considers the international exposure of a country’s banks 
through cross border lending, as well as lending through the affiliates (local claims under 
the BIS definition). Under that basis the Czech subsidiary of a German bank is counted as 
a German entity. The consolidated data encompass three types of lending: cross-border 
lending (a), lending through affiliates in another currency than the local one (b), and 
lending through affiliates in the local currency (c). 
The data are available on two bases: the “immediate borrower” basis which 
considers the entity that the bank lends to, and the “ultimate risk” basis corrects for the 
fact that the borrower could itself be part of a corporate group active in many countries. 
The immediate borrower basis includes a longer horizon (since 1983) but only indicates 
lending in foreign currency, either cross-border or through an affiliate (a and b above, 
international claims under the BIS definition), and lending through affiliates in local 
currency (c). The ultimate risk basis by contrast distinguishes cross-border lending (a) 
from lending through affiliates (b and c), but is only available since 2005 and covers a 
more narrow set of reporting banks. 
 
Foreign and domestic holdings 
 
We contrast international and domestic holdings using data from financial 
accounts / flow of funds statistics. The data present the value of an economy’s financial 
assets and liabilities by sector (households, non-financial businesses, government, 
financial sector, and rest of the world). The assets of the rest of the world correspond to 
the liabilities of the country to foreign investors. Similarly, the liabilities of the rest of the 
world represent assets held abroad by the country’s residents. The value of financial 
assets held by residents is the sum of financial assets held by domestic sectors. The share 




Our analysis uses annual data for 22 countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and 
United States). The data are taken from the OECD and Eurostat. The sample starts at 
different dates for different countries, but all are covered from 2003 onwards. The data 
cover the value of assets at the end of 2007 for all 22 countries, but the values at the end 
of 2009 are available only for 13 countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 





Appendix B. Definition of variables 
 
GDP per capita: GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars, 2007. Source: IMF, World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
 
GDP growth 2005-2007: average GDP growth during the period 2005-2007. Source: 
IMF, WEO database. 
 
Financial openness: Sum of external assets and liabilities over GDP for end-2005. 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, External Wealth of Nations Mark II (EWN II) database. 
 
Gross Debt: sum of debt assets (including reserves) and liabilities divided by GDP, end-
2005. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, EWN II database. 
 
Gross Debt (banks): sum of bank external assets and liabilities in the form of debt 
instruments divided by GDP, end-2005. Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF, 
Balance of Payments Statistics and BIS, locational banking statistics. 
 
Gross Equity: sum of portfolio equity and FDI assets and liabilities divided by GDP, 
end-2005. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, EWN II database. 
 
Net Debt: difference between debt assets (including reserves) and debt liabilities, divided 
by GDP, end-2005. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, EWN II database. 
 
Net debt (banks): difference between bank external assets and liabilities in the form of 
debt instruments divided by GDP, end-2005. Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF, 
Balance of Payments Statistics and BIS, locational banking statistics. 
 
Net Equity: difference between the sum of portfolio equity and FDI assets and portfolio 




NFA/GDP: Net foreign asset position divided by GDP, end-2005. Source: Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, EWN II database. 
 
Net position vis-à-vis BIS banks: net position vis-à-vis BIS-reporting banks divided by 
GDP, December 2005. Source: BIS, locational banking statistics.  
 
Foreign exchange reserves: Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
 
Trade openness: Sum of imports and exports of goods and services over GDP. Source: 
IMF, WEO. 
 
Share of manufacturing output: Share of manufacturing output in total output. Source: 
United Nations.  
 
Commodity trade balance: Balance of trade in commodities divided by GDP. Source: 
authors’ calculations based on United Nations data. 
 
Private Credit / GDP  and change in private credit/GDP: World Bank Financial 
Structure database (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000, 2009) and updates in Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2010).  
 
Change in growth: difference in GDP growth between the 2008-09 average and the 
2005-2007 average. Source: IMF, WEO database. 
 
Change in growth in trading partners: difference in GDP growth in trading partners 
between the 2008-09 average and the 2005-2007 average. Source: IMF, WEO database. 
 
Change in public debt projections: difference in the projected ratio of gross 
government debt to GDP for 2012 between the April 2009 April 2009 WEO and the 
April 2007 WEO. Source: IMF, WEO database. 
 
Change in fiscal balance projections: difference in the projected ratio of the fiscal 
balance to GDP for 2012 between the April 2009 WEO and the April 2007 WEO. 
Source: IMF, WEO database. 
 
Change in growth projections: difference in the projected average growth rate for the 
period 2009-2012 between the April 2009 April 2009 WEO and the April 2007 WEO. 
Source: IMF, WEO database. 
 
Credit market restriction index: Economic Freedom of the World index of credit 
market regulation (Giannone et al. 2010).  
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Table 1: Foreign claims of BIS-reporting banks, consolidated basis 
Annualized percentage change 
 
Immediate borrower basis  Ultimate risk basis 














Claims on all countries  Claims on all countries 
Total foreign claims  26.2  -5.6  52.6  Total foreign claims  27.0  -5.6  43.3 
Cross-border Cross-border  26.8  -7.1   
Affiliates, foreign curr. 
26.6 -7.2   
Affiliates, foreign curr. 
Affiliates, local curr.  25.5  -2.2    Affiliates, local curr. 
27.3 -3.7   
Claims on developed countries  Claims on developed countries 
Total foreign claims  25.2  -7.0  41.2  Total foreign claims  24.9  -7.2  33.6 
Cross-border Cross-border  24.0  -8.0   
Affiliates, foreign curr. 
25.4 -8.5   
Affiliates, foreign curr. 
Affiliates, local curr.  24.7  -3.9    Affiliates, local curr. 
26.2 -6.2   
Claims on developing countries  Claims on developing countries 
Total foreign claims  35.9  2.0  7.6  Total foreign claims  40.2  2.2  6.9 
Cross-border Cross-border  45.4  0.2   
Affiliates, foreign curr. 
37.5 1.6   
Affiliates, foreign curr. 
Affiliates, local curr.  34.0  2.5    Affiliates, local curr. 
36.3 3.8   
 
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics. International bank exposure (foreign claims) takes the form of A) cross-border claims, B) claims through local 
affiliates in foreign currency and C) claims through local affiliates in local currency. 
The data on the “immediate borrower” basis split “international claims” (A+B and C) but do not include cross-border claims separately. 
The data on the “ultimate risk” basis distinguish between cross border claims and claims through local affiliates in all currencies (B+C), but start only in 2005 
and cover a narrower set of reporting banks.  
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Table 2. IMF assistance under Stand-by-arrangements 
USD billions 
 
  Arrangement initialized during the 








Hungary 15.9  11.5     
Romania     17.3  12.5 
Ukraine 16.6  10.6     
Pakistan 10.9  6.3    
Other 9.2  4.4  9.0  2.4 
Total 52.6  32.8  26.3  14.9 
 






Table 3. Drivers of world capital flows. 
 









-0.0029 -0.0046**  -0.0059**  VIX index on the S&P500 
[0.0018] [0.0022] [0.0023] 
      
3.134*** 2.724*** 2.434***  World GDP growth 
[0.607] [0.735] [0.730] 
      
World trade openness  1.645***  1.460***  1.512*** 
[0.514] [0.540] [0.532] 
      
Trend -0.001  -0.002  -0.003** 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
      
Constant -0.54***  -0.40**  -0.29 
[0.15] [0.18] [0.18] 
   
Sample 1993Q1  1996Q1  1998Q1 
  - 2009Q4  - 2009Q4  - 2009Q4 
Observations 68  56  48 
R-squared 0.64  0.66  0.72 
 
Note: World trade openness is defined as world exports and imports over GDP. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 





Table 4. Decline in gross capital inflows excluding official flows (in percent of GDP):  
Mean and median differences in variables between countries not suffering a sudden stop  











Change in capital flows 
Change in inflows net of official flows (pct of GDP)  33.4 30.9    10.1
Change in outflows (pct of GDP)  17.5 21.8    4.7
International financial exposure 
Financial openness/GDP  -108% -78%    -2.9
Gross debt/GDP  -73% -56%    -3.4
Gross debt (banks)/GDP  -68% -69%    -4.4
Gross equity/GDP  -35% -42%    -2.0
FX reserves/GDP  -2% -1%    -0.4
NFA/GDP 6% -3%    0.6
Net debt position excl reserves/GDP  7% 5%    1.0
Net bank debt position/GDP  13% 16%    2.3
Net equity position/GDP  0% 5%    0.0
Net position vis-à-vis BIS banks/GDP  16% 14%    4.4
Domestic macroeconomic characteristics 
GDP per capita  -14,207 -16,915    -2.6
GDP growth 2005-2007  0.4 1.1   0.4
Change in private credit to GDP ratio  -0.1 -0.1    -1.2
Change in growth (2008-09 – 2005-07)  3.0 0.8    1.7
Change in public debt projections  -16% -20%    -2.8
Change in fiscal balance projections  2.7% 2.7%    2.4
Change in growth projections  1% 0.4%    2.0
Credit market restriction index  -0.5 -0.4    -1.4
Impact of international trade 
Change in growth trading partners (2008-09 – 2005-07)  0.9 0.6    2.1
Share of manufacturing output  -1.4% -1.9%    -0.7
Commodity trade balance  3.8% 3.7%    0.9
Trade openness  -36% -25%    -2.4
 
Note: the table shows the difference of variables between the countries in the bottom quartile of 
capital inflows decline (i.e. the smallest decline) and the countries in the top quartile.  
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Table 5. Decline in gross capital outflows (in percent of GDP):  
Mean and median differences in variables between countries without a large reduction in outflows 











Change in capital flows 
Change in outflows (pct of GDP)  29.5 30.4    12.1
Change in inflows net of official flows (pct of GDP)  20.8 20.0    4.5
International financial exposure  
Financial openness/GDP  -145.9 -143.3    -4.4
Gross debt/GDP  -88% -94%    -3.8
Gross debt (banks)/GDP  -71% -85%    -4.6
Gross equity/GDP  -56% -58%    -4.1
FX reserves/GDP  1% 0%    0.2
NFA/GDP -14% -13%    -1.2
Net debt position excl reserves/GDP  -1% 5%    -0.1
Net bank debt position/GDP  10% 13%    1.7
Net equity position/GDP  -14% -5%    -1.6
Net position vis-à-vis BIS banks/GDP  15% 15%    2.5
Domestic macroeconomic characteristics 
GDP per capita  -20,160 -16,035    -3.3
GDP growth 2005-2007  0.5 1.3   0.5
Change in private credit to GDP ratio  -0.1 -0.1   -2.7
Change in growth (2008-09 – 2005-07)  2.6 0.5   1.6
Change in public debt projection  -15% -15%    -2.8
Change in fiscal balance projections  3.1% 3.2%    3.6
Change in growth projections  1% 0.8%    2.1
Credit market restriction index  -0.7 -0.9    -2.5
Impact of international trade 
Change in growth in trading partners (2008-09 – 2005-07)  1.0 0.5    2.5
Share of manufacturing output  3.4% 4.7%    1.5
Commodity trade balance -4.3% -1.0%    -1.1
Trade openness  -23% -31%    -1.4
 
Note: the table shows the difference of variables between the countries in the bottom quartile of 
capital outflows decline (i.e. the smallest decline) and the countries in the top quartile.  
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Table 6. Collapse stage, gross capital inflows. 
 
Dependent variables: annualized change in gross inflows between 2006Q1-2007Q2 and 2008Q4-
2009Q1, scaled by 2007 GDP. 
 
  Total inflows  Excluding official flows 
  All Emerging  Advanced  All Emerging  Advanced 
    
-2.39 12.48 -11.74  17.22**  33.57**  10.83  Net debt position excl. 
reserves (ratio of GDP)  [8.75] [15.78] [16.34] [7.65] [15.48] [12.44] 
            
-7.49* -3.37  -10.68**  -9.08**  -8.28**  -11.59**  Gross debt position / GDP 
[3.86] [5.01]  [4.80] [3.43] [3.34]  [4.72] 
            
GDP growth 2005-07  -0.46  -0.81  -1.68  -1.65*  -1.90**  -1.03 
 [0.85]  [1.10]  [4.31]  [0.82]  [0.85]  [3.21] 
            
Private credit / GDP, 2007  -5.83  -13.11***    -2.36  -10.44**   
 [3.96]  [4.15]    [3.88]  [3.84]   
            
Log GDP per capita  -2.09  -2.72    -3.06*  -5.18**   
 [1.88]  [2.39]    [1.64]  [2.13]   
            
Growth in trading partners  2.89*  2.59    2.59  1.75   
 [1.72]  [2.11]    [1.55]  [1.61]   
            
Constant 35.14**  44.57**  -0.23  49.65*** 71.65***  5.28 
 [16.89]  [21.74]  [13.80]  [15.71]  [19.72]  [10.84] 
    
Observations 57  40  17  57  40  17 
R-squared 0.40  0.49  0.25  0.49  0.64  0.32 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 7. Collapse stage, gross capital outflows. 
 
Dependent variables: annualized change in gross outflows between 2006Q1-2007Q2 and 2008Q4-
2009Q1, scaled by 2007 GDP. 
 
Total outflows  Excluding official flows 
All Emerging  Advanced  All Emerging  Advanced 
0.35 9.5  -12.35  13.01  29.56  -6.45  Net debt position (excl 
reserves)/GDP  [8.21] [12.91]  [11.14]  [13.01]  [23.35]  [12.26] 
Reserves / GDP  1.38  -23.2    -8.14  -48.63   
 [13.82]  [17.36]    [28.22]  [31.85]   
Gross debt position / GDP  -8.59**  2.75  -12.48***  -9.01**  6.88  -12.13** 
 [3.41]  [5.67]  [3.31]  [4.19]  [5.95]  [4.20] 
GDP growth 2005-07  -0.34  -0.67  -3.61  -1.23  -2.11  -3.32 
 [0.73]  [0.97]  [2.55]  [1.17]  [1.78]  [2.76] 
oil exporter dummy  -11.74***  -16.08***    -22.79***  -30.85***   
 [3.67]  [4.65]    [7.47]  [8.05]   
log GDP per capita  -1.96  -2.15    -0.77  -1.25   
 [1.40]  [1.90]    [2.07]  [3.29]   
Growth in trading partners  1.91  2.38    2.62  3.03   
 [1.16]  [1.47]    [1.76]  [2.41]   
Constant 25.38*  29.51  7.29  24.55  35.88  7.38 
 [14.06]  [19.12]  [9.19]  [21.18]  [31.51]  [10.10] 
            
Observations 57  40 17 57  40  17
R-squared 0.46  0.48 0.47 0.33  0.46  0.32
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 8. Collapse stage, bank flows. 
 
Dependent variables: annualized change in flows between 2006Q1-2007Q2 and 2008Q4-2009Q1, 
scaled by 2007 GDP. 
 
  Total inflows  Net inflows 
 All Emerging Advanced  All  Emerging  Advanced 
Net bank position / GDP  12.37  53.19**  0.73  15.1  42.35  7.3 
 [11.26]  [21.67]  [10.81]  [11.46]  [25.29]  [13.99] 
Gross bank position/GDP  -16.08***  -12.06  -15.80*** -6.30*  -12.27**  -4.16 
 [3.70]  [8.71]  [3.43]  [3.17]  [5.87]  [3.64] 
GDP growth 2005-07  -1.15*  -1.41**  0.41  -1.69**  -1.79*  -0.66 
 [0.60]  [0.65]  [2.50]  [0.78]  [0.88]  [2.20] 
Log GDP per capita  0.06  -0.06    -0.16  0.24   
 [1.02]  [1.48]    [1.38]  [1.82]   
oil -3.56  -5.21    -3.62  -4.09   
 [3.14]  [3.09]    [2.96]  [3.23]   
Growth in trading partners  1.32  -0.29    0.98  -0.81   
 [1.23]  [1.12]    [1.33]  [1.39]   
Constant 12.62  8.04  0.3  15.58  6.11  3.05 
 [10.22]  [12.48]  [7.86]  [12.89]  [14.39]  [7.71] 
            
Observations 53  37  16  53  37  16 
R-squared 0.59  0.60  0.62  0.32  0.46  0.08 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 9. Recovery stage, gross capital inflows. 
 
Dependent variables: annualized change in gross inflows between 2006Q1-2007Q2 and 2009Q2-
2009Q4, scaled by 2007 GDP. 
 
  Total inflows  Excluding official flows 
  All Emerging  Advanced  All Emerging  Advanced 
    
-1.85 19.56  -20.3  4.78 19.08  -4.79  Net debt position excl. 
reserves (ratio of GDP)  [9.87] [14.84] [16.41] [7.01] [14.83] [7.89] 
            
-7.33* -5.00  -12.02**  -7.38**  -8.59*  -10.75**  Gross debt position / GDP 
[4.11] [5.58]  [4.95] [3.19] [4.28]  [4.27] 
            
GDP growth 2005-07  0.55  0.17  -1.35  0.4  0.33  0.44 
 [0.93]  [1.10]  [2.86]  [0.91]  [1.07]  [2.50] 
            
Private credit / GDP, 2007  0.2  -3.34    0.95  0.02   
 [3.63]  [3.83]    [3.40]  [3.87]   
            
Log GDP per capita  -0.96  -1.94    0.39  -1.55   
 [1.86]  [2.18]    [1.56]  [2.17]   
            
Growth in trading partners  3.91**  2.99    4.83***  4.14**   
 [1.63]  [1.85]    [1.51]  [1.59]   
            
Constant  24.75  34.62* 7.11 17.61  34.90* 6.33 
 [15.03]  [18.37]  [12.61]  [13.89]  [18.17]  [9.92] 
            
Observations 57  40  17  57  40  17 
R-squared 0.33  0.36  0.41  0.38  0.46  0.45 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 10. Recovery stage, gross capital outflows. 
 
Dependent variables: annualized change in gross outflows between 2006Q1-2007Q2 and 2009Q2-
2009Q4, scaled by 2007 GDP. 
 
  Total outflows  Excluding official flows 
  All Emerging  Advanced  All Emerging  Advanced 
-7.24 5.34 -22.54  -5.69  13.52  -26.75  Net debt position (excl 
reserves)/GDP  [6.81] [11.02] [13.22] [8.13] [13.42] [15.84] 
Reserves / GDP  13.64  2.03    23.4  2.96   
 [10.58]  [8.19]    [16.06]  [12.66]   
Gross debt position / GDP  -8.13* -0.92  -12.13**  -8.37* 0.36 -10.70* 
 [4.05]  [3.91]  [4.94]  [4.46]  [4.07]  [5.46] 
GDP growth 2005-07  0.79  0.34  -1.63  0.54  -0.45  -1.28 
 [0.81]  [0.80]  [2.32]  [1.00]  [1.10]  [2.52] 
oil exporter dummy  -9.67*  -7.44*    -13.35*  -10.42   
 [5.27]  [4.07]    [7.96]  [6.53]   
log GDP per capita  1.5  1.47    3.16  3.83   
 [1.66]  [2.08]    [2.54]  [3.38]   
Growth in trading partners  0.73  0.54    0.4  0.07   
 [1.02]  [0.89]    [1.33]  [1.35]   
Constant -14.51  -13.71  7.85  -31.1  -31.53  3.52 
 [14.37]  [16.94]  [11.91]  [23.56]  [28.49]  [14.09] 
           
Observations 57  40  17  57  40  17 
R-squared 0.36  0.11  0.52  0.26  0.20  0.44 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Recovery stage, bank capital inflows. 
 
Dependent variables: annualized change in flows between 2006Q1-2007Q2 and 2009Q2-2009Q4, 
scaled by 2007 GDP. 
 
  Total inflows  Net inflows 
 All Emerging  Advanced All Emerging  Advanced 
Net bank position / GDP  15.52*  37.07**  8.99  11.66  28.73**  3.03 
  [8.78] [14.90] [10.40] [9.28] [12.78] [13.25] 
Gross bank position/GDP  -8.68***  -7.36  -8.26**  -0.63  -7.85  1.72 
 [2.69]  [5.09]  [2.85]  [3.53]  [4.96]  [4.33] 
GDP growth 2005-07  0  -0.03  0.77  0.05  0.11  -0.51 
 [0.41]  [0.37]  [2.95]  [0.43]  [0.35]  [2.93] 
Log GDP per capita  1.33  1.17    1.26  1.82*   
 [0.86]  [0.81]    [0.96]  [0.91]   
Oil -5.88*  -7.09**    -2.64  -5.57***   
 [3.23]  [3.38]    [2.97]  [1.92]   
Growth in trading partners  2.28***  1.61    3.21***  2.23**   
 [0.79]  [0.98]    [1.00]  [1.08]   
Constant -0.72  -2.02  -0.91  2.58  -4.98  -0.98 
 [8.43]  [7.57]  [7.51]  [9.85]  [8.87]  [8.28] 
            
Observations 53  37  16  53  37  16 
R-squared 0.54  0.69  0.34  0.35  0.65  0.02 
 





Figure 1. Global Capital Flows, 1975-2009 
Percent of world GDP 
 
 
Note: sum of gross capital inflows across the world’s countries, as a ratio of world GDP. Source: Lane 
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Figure 2. Financial deepening, advanced economies 






















Figure 3. Evolution of home bias, 2004-2007 
Change in the ratio of external financial assets to total financial assets, annual rate 
























































































































































































































































































Due to changes in asset prices Due to acquisition of assets Change in ratio
 
Note: the chart decomposes the average annual change in the ratio of external financial assets (EA) to total financial 
assets (FA). The component due to the acquisition of assets (capital flows) is calculated as the change in the ratio 
that would occur if capital flows were the only driver: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ) / 1 ( / _ / _   ; ; i FA EA FA Flows FA EA Flows EA i t i t t i t i t t i t i t − − − − − − − + + , where  t i t EA Flows ; _   −  
( t i t FA Flows ; _   − ) is total net purchases of external assets (total financial assets) between year t-i and year t. The 
component due to changes in asset prices is the residual.  
  48
Figure 4. Measures of capital mobility 
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Sources: Chinn and Ito (2008), Schindler (2009).  
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Figure 5. Cross border bank lending 
Holdings at year-end, percent of world GDP. 
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Source: BIS locational banking statistics.  
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